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'...there are parts of the
world where things are badly
wrong...':
Forum Selection Clauses and
Unfair Jurisdictions
Janet Walker*, Stefan Rotzel t and Sylvia WOnsche*
Introduction
As markets and economies converge, the world is becoming a smaller place.
However, for businesses taking up the opportunities that this affords, the
world can sometimes seem larger and stranger than ever. When things go
wrong it may be necessary to bring a claim or to defend against one in an
unfamiliar legal system. At the very moment when they are most hoping for
order to be restored, businesspeople can find themselves facing pitfalls and
perils far worse than they imagined possible.
The problem is not new. The Commercial Court in London grew to
prominence because it could provide effective and reliable dispute resolution in
commercial matters that might otherwise fall to be resolved in fora which inspired
* ProfessorJanet Walker of Osgoode Hall Law School, Canada, can be contacted atjwalk-
er@osgoode.yorku.ca. For more information on conflict of laws in Canada see Walker
Castel & Walker: Canadian Conflict ofLaws, 6 ed.
( Stefan Rfttzel is a Partner at Gleiss Lutz Rechtsanwalte, Frankfurt and can be contacted
at stefan.ruetzel@gleisslutz.com. For more information on civil procedural law in Ger-
many see S Ratzel, Wegen and Wilske, Commercial Dispute Resolution in Germany (2005).
( Sylvia Wftnsche is a Senior Associate at Gleiss Lutz Rechtsanwdilte, Frankfurt and can be
contacted at sylvia.wuensche@gleisslutz.com.
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less confidence. International commercial arbitration has similarly flourished
as a result of the desire to secure effective and reliable dispute resolution in
situations in which this might not be available in the local courts.
But the international business community itself has grown. A much greater
variety of participants are operating in a much broader range of industries
and markets. The business that is being done may be more conducive to
dispute resolution in courts located away from the major financial centres.
And even if it is not, the businesspeople now engaging in international
transactions may be less experienced in planning for dispute resolution,
and so wind up in other courts.
Where businesspeople fail to plan for dispute resolution and find
themselves in fora that they would not have chosen, the recommendation
is obvious: think ahead. But even worse situations can arise when they
plan badly. Their contract may contain a forum selection clause that calls
for the resolution of disputes in a jurisdiction with an unfair legal system.
They may find themselves in a place in which they sense an atmosphere of
hostility to foreign businesses, or a place in which the judiciary seems to lack
independence, or is widely thought to be corrupt. They may believe that
they are unlikely to receive a fair hearing of their claims or defences or, even
more troubling, that they are at risk of suffering personal harm by attending
and participating in the proceedings.
Does a forum selection clause require a party to respond to a notice of
proceeding and to defend against a claim brought in the nominated forum
even if the legal system is unfair? If the clause is exclusive, does it preclude
a party from presenting a claim in another forum? Must the courts of other
countries recognise and enforce judgments issued in nominated fora whose
judicial systems are demonstrated to be unfair? Difficult though they may
be, these questions are pressing for litigants and for courts alike as they face
the challenges of an increasingly globalised economy.
1 Special provisions are made for consumers, workers and people involved in insurance
claims. For example, Article 3149 CCQ confers jurisdiction on Quebec courts in cases in-
volving consumer contracts or contracts of employment, and the waiver of such jurisdic-
tion by the consumer or worker may not be set up against him or her. Article 3150 CCQ
confers jurisdiction in an action based on a contract of insurance where the holder, the
insured or the beneficiary of the contract is a domiciled resident in Quebec, the contract
is related to an insurable interest situated in Quebec or the loss took place in Quebec.
Articles 8-21 of the Brussels Regulation provide similar protections for these groups:
EU Regulation on Jurisdiction and on Recognition and Enforcement ofJudgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December
2000 ('Brussels Regulation') available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index. As more
and more small businesses begin to conduct business with agreements containing forum
selection clauses, courts are beginning to consider the extent to which they too should
enjoy protections similar to other protected classes. No doubt, appropriate legal stand-
ards will emerge and will be refined for new participants in international business.
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The effect of forum selection clauses in favour of unfair jurisdictions
raises three kinds of issues: legal issues, evidentiary issues and issues of
general perception. This article considers these three kinds of issues from
the perspectives of the common law and the civil law.
The legal issues
In principle, the legal issues seem to be the most straightforward. Instinctively,
it seems wrong to consign a litigant to a tribunal in which justice will not be
done, and wrong to give effect to the resulting judgment, even if the parties
have nominated that forum in their agreement. Whether this is understood
as a matter of public policy, or a denial ofjustice, or a breach of the minimum
standards of treatment of foreign businesses, it reflects basic principles of
fairness in international dispute resolution.
The study of the American Law Institute entitled Recognition andEnforcement
ofForeign Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute recognised this. The
proposed federal statute would require American courts to refuse recognition
and enforcement if the party resisting recognition or enforcement established
that thejudgment was rendered under a system that does not provide impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with fundamental principles of fairness.
The Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on
Choice of Court Agreements 2005' also contains provisions that could be
invoked to address the concerns raised by forum selection clauses nominating
unfair jurisdictions. Article 6 of the Convention excuses courts other than
the chosen court from suspending or dismissing proceedings brought before
them where this would lead to a manifest injustice. Accordingly, where trial
in the nominated forum would be manifestly unjust, a court is not required
to stay a proceeding before it that was commenced in breach of the clause.
Article 9 permits courts to refuse recognition or enforcement of ajudgment
if the specific proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible with
the enforcing court's fundamental principles of procedural fairness. Thus, by
agreeing to resolve disputes in an unfair forum, a party will not be deprived
of the right to complain of unfairness in the proceeding and the right to ask
an enforcing court not to give effect to the result.
But, as with many legal issues in the common law, things are a little less
straightforward in practice than they are in principle. It is not the clear
cases that cause us difficulty in deciding whether to hold the parties to
2 American Law Institute, Recognition and Enforcement ofForeignJudgments: Analysis and
Proposed Federal Statute (Philadelphia: The Institute, 2006), available at www.ali.org.
3 The Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements, 30 June 2005, available at www.hcch.net.
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their bargain or whether to relinquish them from it - it is the vast range of
situations in between. Even small procedural differences and irregularities
that are outcome-determinative may seem outrageously unfair to a party
that has lost the case, or that stands to lose it. And forum selection clauses
tend to be treated in an extraordinarily casual way until they are invoked.
How much unfairness does it take to overturn a forum selection clause?
How much deference should be shown to party autonomy in upholding a
forum selection clause?
Common law courts retain a residual discretion to exercise jurisdiction
in breach of a forum selection clause. In a number of countries, such as
Canada,' the 'strong cause test'0 still applies. Courts will ordinarily stay a
proceeding brought in breach of a forum selection clause except where there
is strong cause not to do so. The factors initially proposed for determining
what would constitute 'strong cause' seemed to involve a review of the same
factors that would be considered in determining appropriate forum, but
the better view seems to be that courts should not release parties from their
bargain simply on the basis that it turns out to be a bad bargain; they should
apply the kind of standards used for other contractual terms. Equitable
doctrines such as mistake, frustration and change of circumstance can be
invoked to relieve parties from the kinds of obligations that no reasonable
person would undertake. This would appear to be a sensible approach to
take in deciding whether to set aside forum selection clauses in favour of
unfair jurisdictions.
Within Europe no discretion exists. Pursuant to Article 23 of the Brussels
Regulation, a forum selection clause is presumed to be exclusive and it
deprives the court ofjurisdiction to decide the matter. There is no residual
discretion, such as through a determination of the validity of the clause,
to prevent unfairness by permitting a court to exercise jurisdiction over a
matter commenced before it in breach of the clause.6 Thus, the parties are
bound to their choice of forum regardless of whether such a choice seems
to be fair from the perspective of the party burdened by such a choice,
or even from the perspective of the court seised in violation of the forum
selection clause.
4 ZI Ponpey Industrie v ECU-Line NV ('The CanmarFortune), [2003] 1 SCR 450.
5 Based on The Eleftheria, [1969] 1 Lloyd's LR 237 (Adm Div).
6 ECJ case C-159197 (Trasporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA v Hugo Trumpy SpA). Cf
ECJ case C-269105 (Francesco Benincasa vDentalkit SrO, available at http://curia.europa.
eu. There is, however, quite some debate on whether this approach should be upheld, cf
Horn, Einwand des Rechtsmissbrauchs gegen eine Gerichtsstandsvereinbarung iSd Art 23 EuGVO,
[2006] Praxis des Internationalen Privat-und Verfahrensrechts 2; Leible/Rder, Miss-
brauchskontrolle von Gerichtsstandsvereinbarungen im Europaischen Zivilprozessrecht, [ 2007]
Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 481.
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Further unfairness can arise through the operation of the lis pendens
provisions in Article 27. A party can be deprived of access to the nominated
forum by its opponent commencing an action in another forum because
that court will need to rule on its own jurisdiction before the matter can
proceed in the nominated forum.7 This dilatory tactic is known as the 'Italian
torpedo' owing to the pace by which Italian courts are expected to reach the
conclusion that some other court had exclusive jurisdiction under a forum
selection clause. By commencing an action in a court that is likely to be slow
to recognise that it lacks jurisdiction, proceedings in the nominated forum
are effectively torpedoed.
If none of the parties to a forum selection agreement is domiciled in a
Member State, the Brussels Regulation instructs European courts to apply
their national laws.9 As a result, in countries such as Germany, a German
court may refuse a dismissal of an action sought in favour of a nominated
forum in certain exceptionally 'unfair' situations. One such situation is where
this would lead to the circumvention of mandatory provisions of German
law where they form part of the German ordre public." For some courts, the
mere danger that the foreign court would not apply mandatory German law
is sufficient." Another situation in which a dismissal may be refused is where
upholding the forum selection agreement would amount to a denial of legal
protection, and thus invoking the forum selection clause would manifestly
appear to be in bad faith.12 This occurred in one case when it was found that
trial in Lebanon would be impossible due to the war," and in another case
when it was found that proceedings could not be commenced in Iran due to a
general strike,14 and in yet another case when it was found that an Iraqi statute
prohibited the determination of claims of foreign contractors." However,
German courts are extremely reluctant to set aside forum selection clauses
7 ECJ case C- 116/02 (Erich Gasser GnbH v MISAT Srl).
8 The Italian Supreme Court has taken steps to rectify this problem by holding that Italian
courts lack jurisdiction under Article 5(3) over foreign defendants in declarations of
non-infringement: Corte di Cassazione of 19 December 2003, no 19550 (BL Macchine
automatiche spa v Windmoller & Holscher K).
9 Brussels Regulation, Article 23.
10 Federal Court ofJustice, [1961] NeueJuristische Wochenschrift 1061; Federal Court of
Justice, [1985] Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 216; Higher Re-
gional Court of Munich, [2007] Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts
322; Regional Labour Court of Frankfurt, docket no 10 Sa 982/99.
11 Higher Regional Court of Munich, [2007] Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfah-
rensrechts 322.
12 Federal Court ofJustice, [1974] Aussenwirtschaftsdienst 221.
13 Federal Court ofJustice, [1979] NeueJuristische Wochenschrift 1119.
14 Regional Labour Court of Frankfurt, [1982] Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 524.
15 Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt, [1999] Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Ver-
fahrensrechts 247.
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on the basis of a denial of legal protection in the nominated forum. 6
Still, in cases in which a German court applies its national substantive
law to determine the validity of a forum selection clause, provisions on
interpretation, avoidance, frustration, review in standard business terms,
good faith and immorality can result in a review of the clause. 7
The evidentiary issues
Far more difficult than the legal issues are the evidentiary issues. How can
a litigant prove systemic unfairness?
The inherent difficulties for common law courts were acknowledged
more than two decades ago by the English Court of Appeal. In Muduroglu v
TC Ziraat Bankasi," Mr Muduroglu asked the court not to grant a stay of his
matter in favour of trial in Turkey, the natural forum, because he would be
unable to get a fair trial there. The Court of Appeal upheld the stay and it
observed that, in the absence of solid evidence, it should not adopt a line of
reasoning involving a finding or assumption of impropriety or unfairness.
Nevertheless, it was noted that courts must not be too unworldly. They 'must
recognize that there are parts of the world where things are badly wrong,
and that by virtue of this very fact it may be impossible to obtain direct and
complete evidence of the grounds of complaint'.
That was 1986. The difficulties of demonstrating unfairness have not
diminished as the pace of globalisation has increased. On the contrary,
as courts have become more 'worldly' they have become less inclined to
brand other fora as 'parts of the world where things are badly wrong'. For
16 Cf eg Higher Regional Court of Hamburg, [1973] AuBenwirtschaftsdienst 690. The
court had to decide on the question whether the possibility that a res judicata USSR judg-
ment could be annulled by the public prosecutor's office or the highest courts was suffi-
cient to set aside the forum selection clause in favour of a USSR forum. According to the
court, this would depend upon the likeliness of such interventions for the disadvantage
of a foreign party. In the case at hand, the court did not overturn the forum selection
clause because the number of such cassations was very low and there was no reason for
an intervention as it was not a politically relevant dispute.
17 Higher Regional Court of Cologne, [1998] Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und
Verfahrensrechts 472 (forum selection clause invalid if the judgment in the foreign
jurisdiction would not be recognisable in Germany due to a lack of reciprocity and the
defendant committed a wilful act in bad faith). Cf Higher Regional Court of Hamburg,
[1982] Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 669 (forum selection clause in a bill of lad-
ing does not apply to an action for wilful falsification of that bill of lading as this would
be an inadmissible exercise of legal rights).
18 Muduroglu v TC Ziraat Bankasi, [1986] QB 1225 (Eng CA); and see Pei v Bank Bumiputra
Malaysia Berhad (1998) 41 OR (3d) 39 (Gen Div) in which an Ontario court refused a
stay in favour of the courts of Malaysia noting the plaintiff's concerns about the inde-
pendence of the judiciary. Neither of these cases involved forum selection clauses.
192
FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES AND UNFAIRJURISDICTIONS
example, two decades later, in Crown Resources Corporation v National Iranian
Oil Companyl9 the Court of Appeal for Ontario granted a stay that was initially
refused on the basis of allegations that the judicial system of the nominated
forum lacked independence. The Court held that the contention that Iran's
judicial system is not as independent as Ontario's could not be relevant. If
it was relevant, then every forum selection clause would be open to attack
because it could always be argued that no other system is as independent as
the one being asked to exercise jurisdiction.
The Court held that businesspeople should be deemed to have informed
themselves about the risks of foreign legal systems and deemed to accept
those risks when they agree to a forum selection clause. This is because,
with globalisation, businesses will increasingly deal with different judicial
systems and must be taken to assess the risks of doing so when they enter
into forum selection agreements. It would 'send the wrong message' if
Canadian courts allowed them to resile from these agreements after the
fact when problems arose.
A similar approach is taken in Germany if the party knew of the unfairness
when the agreement was signed.20 However, even though the parties can
exclude legal recourse in certain circumstances, 2 1 they will not be taken to
do so merely by entering into a forum selection clause. 2 Accordingly, where
a forum selection clause effectively precludes legal recourse, it could be set
aside.
Despite the observation of the English Court of Appeal, the reluctance
of courts, particularly in the common law, to entertain evidence calling into
question the quality ofjustice in a forum selected by the parties has caused
them to be more exacting in the standard of proof, and not less so. But this
reluctance has been matched by an increased determination on the parts of
disappointed litigants, particularly where they are resisting the enforcement
of a judgment from what they regard as an unfair legal system. In Oakwell
19 Crown Resources Corporation v National Iranian Oil Company (2006) 273 DLR (4th) 65
(ON CA), available at www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2006/2006canlii28334/
2006canlii28334.html, and see Dornoch Ltd v Maur tius Union Assurance Co Ltd 2005
EWHC 18887 Comm, available at www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/389.html.
20 Higher Regional Court of Koblenz, [1984] Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Ver-
fahrensrechts 267 (knowledge that Liechtenstein judgment would not be recognisable in
Germany due to lack of reciprocity). Cf Higher Regional Court of Saarbrflcken, [1989]
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift - Rechtsprechungsreport Zivilrecht 828 (knowledge that
Mali judgment would not be recognisable in Germany due to lack of reciprocity).
21 Greger, Zoler: Zivilprozessordnung, 26th edn (2007), before Section 253 no 19.
22 Federal Court ofJustice, [1979] NeueJuristische Wochenschrift 1119.
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Engineering Ltd v Enernorth Industries In the Court of Appeal for Ontario
upheld a decision to enforce ajudgment from the Singapore courts in which
jurisdiction had been exercised on the basis of a forum selection clause in
a settlement agreement. The judgment debtor complained that the judicial
system lacked independence and argued that the judgment should not be
enforced. The motions judge observed that while the judgment debtor
tendered some evidence relating to possible government interference in
trials, that evidence applied only to political cases and there was no evidence
that Singapore courts were biased when deciding a commercial case between
private parties.
Greater determination on the part ofjudgment debtors in another case
succeeded in preventing ajudgment from being enforced on a motion for
summary judgment. In State Bank ofIndia v Navaratna24 the defendants said
that they did not defend against the proceedings in Singapore because they
believed that if they did so they would be incarcerated by the Singapore
authorities. Further, they presented evidence on the motion to show that
their belief was an objectively reasonable one and that the Singaporejustice
system was biased in favour of the plaintiff banks. The court was careful
to observe that a trial judge might not be persuaded that either of these
allegations was well founded. Nevertheless, it could not grant the motion
for summary judgment to enforce the foreign judgment because, as the
court held, 'the Defendants have raised a genuine issue as to a material
fact that would impede the enforcement of the judgments in question
- namely, whether thejudgments were rendered by a court that was corrupt
or biased'.
Perhaps the most troubling feature of this case was the adjudicative
challenge faced by the motions court judge. She was being asked to pass
judgment on the quality of justice in another legal system. The parties
provided as much evidence on the issue as could be expected - so much
so that the summary proceeding resembled a full-blown trial of the foreign
judicial system. And yet, it was not clear how any amount of evidence that
could be adduced at a complete trial would place ajudge in a better position
to make the necessary findings for reaching a conclusion on the matter.
Having pressed the question as extensively as they did, the parties may have
succeeded in demonstrating that, as a matter of practice and prudence,
systemic unfairness may simply be impossible to prove.
23 Oakwell Engineering Ltd vEnernorth Industries Inc (2006) 81 OR (3d) 288 (CA), leave to
appeal refused [20061 SCCA 343, available at www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2006/
2006canliil9327/2006canliil9327.html.
24 State Bank of India v Navaratna [20061 OJ No 1125, available at www.canlii.org/en/on/
onsc/doc/2006/2006canlii8887/2006canlii8887.html.
194
FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES AND UNFAIRJURISDICTIONS
In Europe, under the Brussels Regulation, ajudgment of another European
court may be refused recognition if it is manifestly contrary to the public
policy of the state in which recognition is sought.1 In order for this to
occur, the recognition would have to be a manifest breach of a rule of law
regarded as essential in the legal order of that state or of a right recognised
as fundamental within that legal order 6
In Germany, recognition of ajudgment from a non-European court 7 will be
denied if thejudicial proceeding differed from the main principles of German
procedural law in such a way that the judgment can no longer be regarded as
having been rendered in an orderly, constitutional proceeding (procedural
ordre public)." These principles in particular include independence and
impartiality, the right to be heard, and a fair trial.2 9 However, features of a
foreign judicial system such as US pre-trial discovery, the application of the
American rule of costs and the existence of contingency fees are in line with
the German procedural ordre public." Recognition will also be denied if the
result of the application of foreign law contravenes fundamental ideas of
German provisions and the notions ofjustice contained therein in such away
that it would seem unacceptable under domestic considerations (substantive
ordre public). This could include, for example, US judgments for punitive
damages." These safeguards are a matter of public policy and, therefore,
cannot be waived by the parties in a forum selection clause." Still, a party
must have taken all realistically available measures in the foreign proceeding
25 Brussels Regulation, Article 34 no 1.
26 ECJ case C-7/98 (Dieter Krombach v Andre Bamberski).
27 Section 328 of the German Code of Civil Procedure governs the recognition and en-
forcement in Germany of decisions from non-European courts.
28 Federal Court of Justice, 48 Bundesgerichtshofsentscheidungen 327 cf Federal Court of
Justice, 118 Bundesgerichtshofsentscheidungen 312.
29 Geimer, Zoller: Zivilprozessordnung, 26th edn (2007), Section 328 no 218.
30 Federal Court of Justice, 118 Bundesgerichtshofsentscheidungen. 312.
31 In a 1992 decision, the Federal Court ofJustice held that German civil law only focuses
on the compensation of the plaintiff and has abolished damages that would lead to
an enrichment of the victim and a punishment of the defendant. Further, German
law makes a clear distinction between the law of damages and public prosecution and
criminal law. Federal Court ofJustice, 118 Bundesgerichtshofsentscheidungen 312. In
a number of cases, the Federal Constitutional Court had to decide on the service of a
US writ requesting punitive damages under Article 13 of the Hague Service Conven-
tion. This provision sets a narrower standard than the general ord republic, which must
be respected when it comes to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
Therefore, the considerations laid down in these decisions are not conferrable with the
problems addressed here. Decision of 25July 2003 (Napster v Bertelsmann), [2003] Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 2598. Decisions of 24January 2007 and 14June 2007 available
at www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen.html.
32 Spellenberg, Staudinger, Internationales Verfahrensrecht in Ehesachen (2005), Section 328 nos
251 and 470.
195
DISPUTE RESOLUTION INTERNATIONAL Vol 1 No 2 December 2007
to object to violations of procedural law." Similarly, if the foreignjudgment
violates the German substantive ordre public and that judgment could have
been reviewed and corrected on appeal in the foreign jurisdiction, probably
no review will be available.34
The issues of general perception
Perhaps, in the end, the scourge of unfair jurisdictions is a matter of
perception. Unfamiliarjudicial procedures have a natural tendency to cause
anxiety, especially among those who are familiar with the judicial process in
their own courts. And where an adverse outcome results, this can be seen as
demonstrating the unfairness of the unfamiliar process.
Discussions between specialists in procedural law from different countries
comparing the features of their respective legal systems can be instructive.
They will often express grave concern at the absence in another legal system
of features that they regard as absolutely essential to fair process and yet they
can be entirely untroubled by the absence in their own system of features
that others regard as essential to fair process.
For example, it can be shocking to a common lawyer to consider a trial
process in which the parties are not permitted to testify, but this works
quite well in the civil law." It can be equally shocking to civil lawyers to
consider a trial process in which the result is placed in the hands of a group
of laypeople who are not obliged to provide reasons, but jury trials are a
constitutional right to Americans. And when confronted with the 'horror'
of large damages awards that are granted from time to time in American
courts, most Americans will shrug their shoulders and say: 'it happens, but
it is usually corrected on appeal'.
It is important to distinguish here between systemic unfairness and
specific instances of egregious procedural irregularity that have occurred in
proceedings leading to judgments which are being resisted on enforcement.
While the latter may still be difficult to prove, they are based on well-
33 Nagel and Gottwald, Internationales Zivilprozessrecht, 6th edn (2007), s 11 no 177; Spellen-
berg, Staudinger, Section 328 no 471 et seq.
34 Spellenberg, Staudinger, Section 328 no 475.
35 See, eg, for Germany: Rfltzel, Wegen and Wilske, Commercial Dispute Resolution in
Germany, p 70 et seq.
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established standards" and they do not present the same problems posed
by the need to speculate on the perceived potential for unfairness or to pass
judgment on an entire civil justice system.
It is also important to clarify here that it would be wrong to try to draw
any connection between the respect held for a country's government or its
legal system as a whole and the quality ofjustice experienced in particular
cases in its civil courts - either for the purpose of condemningjudgments or
for the purposes of refuting specific allegations of impropriety. This point is
obvious to Canadians who are more likely than any to be involved in litigation
in the United States - a country whose judicial system is highly respected,
but which can sometimes produce surprising results. 7
When taken as a whole, it is possible to understand the way in which the
safeguards that exist in most civil justice systems work together to create
a coherent process for resolving disputes; and it is usually possible to
understand the way this process operates within a larger social context that
accommodates its particularities. And so, in the end, evaluating a question
such as the adequacy of judicial independence in another legal system
is probably as complex and nuanced as evaluating the quality of another
country's democracy or its adherence to the rule of law. Whether it can be
done at all is far from clear. But what is becoming clear is that it cannot readily
be done in the course of determining a motion for a stay of proceedings or
for the enforcement of a foreign judgment.
To say that the quality of justice is a matter of general perception is not
to be indifferent to the anxiety that is experienced by litigants who find
themselves in unfamiliar tribunals that appear to be overlooking procedural
steps which they regard as essential to the fairness of the outcome; nor is it
to minimise the hardship that can result from the resolution of a dispute
through a process for which a litigant was not adequately prepared. It is simply
to say that a solution to the problem may not readily be found in the process
of determining the validity of a forum selection clause or the enforceability
of a foreign judgment.
36 For example, common law courts generally make exceptions to recognition and enforce-
ment for judgments rendered in breach of the principles of natural or substantial justice;
see Adams v Cape Industries plc, [1991] 1 All ER 929 (CA); and Article 3155(3) of the Civil
Code of Quebec is typical of civil code exceptions to the recognition and enforcement
of judgments in providing that a Quebec court will not enforce a decision that was ren-
dered in contravention of the fundamental principles of procedure.
37 For example, see The Loewen Group, Inc and Raymond L Loewen v United States ofAmerica
Case No ARB(AF) /98/3 in which recovery under NAFTA Chapter XI was sought for a
denial ofjustice in the US courts.
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Looking ahead
What is to be done? A great deal - and much of it involves the education
of those brave souls now venturing into new markets and territories. They
might never dream of entering into an agreement to do business that was
unfamiliar to them or that required them to deal with complete strangers,
but they can be surprisingly sanguine about leaving the resolution of disputes
that might arise to chance or entrusting it to a judicial system about which
they know nothing. A cursory review of the emerging jurisprudence shows
that this is no more sensible than travelling somewhere new without the
recommended inoculations with the false reassurance that you can always
go to a doctor if you fall ill.
When controversy develops in business dealings, a party's rights are only
as good as the terms of the contract that support them. The terms of the
contract are only as good as the process through which they can be enforced.
And in international contracts, the processes through which contract terms
can be enforced are only as good as the forum selection clause.
The message to businesspeople is clear: in international business
agreements, forum selection clauses are pivotal. They should be taken
seriously. They should be negotiated first.
The message to legal advisers is also clear: in international business, a
careful review of forum selection clauses is fast becoming an essential feature
of any due diligence protocol - attention to the risks posed by resolving
disputes in unfamiliar fora is potentially as significant as assessing political
risk in emerging markets. Moreover a comprehensive legal audit of forum
selection clauses may be warranted for businesses whose dealings involve the
typical range of ancillary and related contracts with forum selection clauses
that have not been given as much attention as the main contracts in the
dealings between the parties.
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